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Abstract: Land conservation investments can make an important contribution to avoidance and 
mitigation of land degradation. Lack of tenure security and land transferability may, however, limit 
the extent to which farmers undertake such investments. Using real option value theory, this paper 
investigates the expected impact of the market-oriented tenure reforms in China since 1998 on land 
conservation investment incentives. It postulates that the reforms are more likely to elicit land 
conservation investments in areas where land markets are developing. This paper further argues 
benefits of the land tenure reforms will be underestimated if only the intrinsic but not the time value 
of changes in the investment incentives will be considered. The findings obtained from this research 
provide a better understanding of the relationship between the land tenure reforms and land 
conservation investments, and are likely to serve sustainable land management in China and 
elsewhere.  
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1. Introduction 
Poverty, agricultural stagnation and resource degradation are frequently interlinked in a 
vicious circle in many developing countries (Development, 1987). Investments in land conservation 
- such as terracing, blocking of soil erosion outlets, and application of organic manure - can play a 
fundamental role in breaking this vicious circle by mitigating soil erosion, restoring soil fertility and 
soil organic matter, and controlling dry land salinization (Kabubo-Mariara, et al. 2007).  
Tenure security and land transferability are generally considered to be important preconditions 
for undertaking land conservation investments (Feder and Feeny, 1991; Besley, 1995; Banerjee and 
Ghatak, 2004; Deininger and Jin, 2006). The underlying theoretical argument claims that secure 
property rights over land encourage land conservation investments through strengthening claims to 
the fruits of the investment (assurance effect) (Banerjee and Ghatak, 2004), allowing for gains from 
trade (transferability effect) (Besley, 1995; Deininger and Jin, 2006) and increasing access to capital 
(collateralizability effect) (Feder and Feeny, 1991).  
The existing literature on property right security and land conservation investments neglects 
two important aspects. First, land conservation investments undertaken by farmers are frequently 
irreversible. Land conservation investments are linked to specific plots, and it may not be easy to 
retrieve them or transfer them technically and economically to other plots. More secure property 
rights provides households with better opportunities to retrieve the costs of investments in land 
quality by negotiating rental prices or compensations for expropriation that reflect these quality 
improvements. Second, empirical studies implicitly assume that farmers have no time flexibility in 
making land investment decisions. More secure land rights, however, may improve the long-term 
investment environment. As a consequence, rural households can decide to defer land-related 
investments until the most appropriate moment. Empirical studies of the impact of property right 
security on land conservation investments focus on immediate benefits and generally fail to take 
this indirect benefit into account. The neglect of these two aspects may explain, at least partially, 
why empirical studies have provided mixed results so far (Holden and Yohannes, 2002; Jacoby et al. 
2002; Kassie, et al. 2012).  
The objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of the market-oriented land tenure reforms 
in China on farmers‘ land conservation investment decisions. To this end, we use an integrated 
framework that takes into account irreversibility of land investment costs and indirect benefits 
obtained from increased time flexibility. We will argue that failure to take these two factors into 
account may underestimate the economic benefits of land tenure reforms in China, in particular the 
environmental benefits.  
The approach used in this paper is to identify the main characteristics of the land reforms, link 
these characteristics to the real option value (ROV) model of investment behavior, and compare the 
outcomes with those of a net present value (NPV) approach that neglects investment irreversibility 
and time flexibility aspects.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background information on the rural 
social structure and the land tenure system and its reforms in China. Three basic characteristics of 
land conservation investments in China are discussed in section 3. These characteristics are used in 
section 4 to analyze the effect of the market-oriented land tenure reforms on land conservation 
investments. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and discusses their implications. 
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2. Rural Social Structure and Land Tenure in China  
The prevailing social structure in rural China plays an important role in both the land tenure 
system and in certain types of land conservation investments. This section will first briefly discuss 
the background of the current social structure. Next, it will pay attention to the evolution of the 
system of land tenure in rural China since 1978, which can be divided into two distinct phases. The 
first phase is the establishment of the household responsibility system (HRS), guided by egalitarian 
principles. The second phase consists of adjustments of the HRS aimed at increasing tenure security 
and transferability. 
2.1 Rural Social Structure 
At the beginning of the foundation of the Peoples‘ Republic of China, China implemented a 
policy of collectivization which required farmers to surrender land to collectives, and adopt a 
shareholding cooperative production way. As a consequence, Chinese farmers were deprived of the 
bundle of control and income rights (Kung, 2000). From 1953 to 1957, mutual-aid teams and 
elementary cooperatives were gradually founded. The collective production organization had been 
further enhanced since the foundation of the people‘s communes in 1958. During the period of the 
people‘s communes the collective land ownership was established, and land has been fully 
collectivized. The collective production organization was the major rural social structure in China 
from 1953 to 1978. The collective production organization in the people‘s communes included three 
levels: people‘s commune, production brigade and production team. 
The people‘s communes were gradually dismantled during the implementation of the HRS that 
started in 1978. The HRS granted farmers land use rights, with the defunct production teams 
continuing to be the owners of the collective land. The collective production organization has 
changed significantly since 1978. The people‘s communes, production brigades and production 
teams have been transformed into townships, administrative villages and natural villages, 
respectively. Many joint decisions about local infrastructure investment and maintenance and land 
reallocations are taken through self-governed rules at the administrative village level, and are 
sometimes delegated to the natural village level. The social cohesion within natural and 
administrative villages is still relatively strong and affects a range of economic decisions taken at 
the local level, including land conservation investments.   
2.2 Land Tenure under the HRS 
In 1978, the resolution of the Opening and Reform Policy required to dismantle fully 
collectivized land property rights in order to enhance agricultural productivity. The HRS was firstly 
introduced as a trial in Xiaogang Village, Fengyang County, Anhui Province in 1979, and then was 
implemented across the country from 1981 onwards. The HRS allocated collective land resources to 
individual farm households according to equalitarian principles. The size of the land assigned to 
households within a village was determined by the household size and/or the number of laborers in 
a household (Tan, 2006). Farmers were given land use rights for a period of 15 years and the right 
to obtain a portion of the income derived from the land, while land ownership remained with the 
collective (see Tan et al. 2011 for a detailed discussion of rural land property rights in China). The 
implementation of the HRS improved labor monitoring efficiency and gave farmers greater 
production incentives, leading to a sharp growth in land productivity (McMillan et al., 1989; Lin, 
1992). The egalitarian principles underlying this system of land allocation, however, had four 
important, less desirable consequences. 
Firstly, to deal with differences in land quality (particularly soil fertility, irrigation and 
drainage conditions) within a village, land was divided into different classes. Each household in a 
village received at least one plot of each land class. A high degree of land fragmentation was the 
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result, with households having on average 8.4 plots with a plot size of only 0.07 ha in 1986 (Qu, et 
al. 1995; Tan, 2006). 
Secondly, administrative reallocations of land were used by village officials to address 
demographic changes within a village. Either full-scale or partial land reallocations have been 
implemented. Under full-scale reallocations all farmland in the village is given back to the 
collective and, after subtracting proportional shares of land needed for other purposes, redistributed 
proportionally among village households. Under partial reallocations only the land of those 
households who experienced demographic changes (birth, death, marriage, migration) was 
reallocated among these households while leaving the rest of the land unaffected (Deininger and Jin, 
2009; Wang et al. 2011). The practice of frequent reallocations in response to changes in household 
sizes or composition, with households typically not being compensated for investments in the land 
that they have made, is generally believed to introduce tenure insecurity (see e.g. Lohmar, 2003; 
Wang, et al. 2011). 
Thirdly, the HRS regulations stipulated that land can only be allocated to households residing 
within a village. Consequently, the land use rights granted to a farm household may be dispossessed 
by its village when that household moves out of a village. Farmers therefore face the risk of losing 
land use rights when they leave a village for off-farm work.  
Finally, transfers of land use rights possessed by farmers are not allowed under the HRS. This 
regulation was intended to avoid growing land inequality, but reduced the scope for further 
efficiency gains in agricultural production. Subsequent reforms in the land tenure system aimed to 
address in particular these major shortcomings in the system.  
2.3 Reforms of the Land Tenure System 
The first steps towards reforming the land tenure system can be traced back to the early 1990s. 
The Land Administration Law (LAL) of 1986, which formally introduced the basis of the HRS, 
formally granted land rights to farmers. Farmers‘ land rights are supposed to be secure and 
extended. In practice, however, farmers‘ rights were frequently challenged and land transfers 
mainly took place through administrative reallocations (Vendryes, 2010). The No. 11 Central 
Document of the Central Committee, the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), issued in 1993, 
specified that farmers‘ land rights will be extended by 30 years after the 15-years period has ended. 
And the No. 16 Central Document of the CCCPC published in 1997 strictly limited village land 
reallocations or takings. Although these regulations remained declarations of principles and lacked 
actual implementation procedures and were not binding on any of the parties, they provided 
important guidelines for the series of land laws that followed (Chen and Davis, 1998). 
The 1998 revision of the LAL stipulates that the duration of land use rights will be extended by 
another 30 years, that farmers‘ land use rights are protected by law, that land certificates will be 
issued to protect farmers‘ land use rights, that land transfer rights are offered to farmers, and that 
acceptance by two-thirds of villagers‘ representatives and approval of higher-level governments is 
needed for land reallocation within villages. The Rural Land Contract Law (RLCL) of 2002 
confirms that farmland tenure security must be maintained for at least 30 years after the nationwide 
reallocation that started in 1998. It further states that full-scale land reallocations within villages are 
completely prohibited and that partial land reallocations are only allowed in case of a natural 
disaster, land expropriation or other special circumstances, in which case they depend on acceptance 
by two-thirds of villagers‘ representatives and approval by higher-level (e.g. township) authorities. 
In addition, it specifies that the collective cannot take (back) land from individual users without 
providing compensation. An important novel element of the RLCL is the specification of land 
transfer rights, including the rights of subcontracting (zhuan bao), leasing (chu zu), exchanging (hu 
huan), transferring (zhuan rang) and transferring land through ―other means‖. The RLCL, however, 
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does not provide clear rules for the inheritance of land use rights. Yet, the RLCL can be seen as 
important milestone marking a significant increase in transferability and in property rights security 
(see also Deininger and Jin, 2009). 
The Property Law (PL), adopted in 2007, further increased land tenure security in rural (and 
urban) areas. It implicitly grants farmers with perpetual rights, as it states that farmers should retain 
and inherit their rights according to relevant rules when the 30 years period has passed. Moreover, 
the PL for the first time defines farmers‘ land use rights as usufructuary. Usufruct rights allow a 
better protection of farmers‘ interests (Ho, 2005). Further legal support of farmers‘ interests is 
provided by the Mediation and Arbitration of Rural Land Contract Disputes Law, adopted in 2009, 
which sets out principles related to the use of mediation or arbitration to settle land disputes. 
In 2008 the third Plenary Session of the 17th CCCPC reconfirmed that the rural land tenure 
system is characterized by a two-tier management system consisting of collective ownership and 
farmers‘ permanent usufructuary rights. It approved a document stipulating that markets for the 
lease of contracted farmland and transfer of farmland use rights must be set up and improved to 
allow farmers to sub-contract, lease, exchange and swap their land use rights, or join share-holding 
entities with their farmland. Participation by farmers in such transfers of land use rights must be 
voluntarily, with adequate payment and in accordance with the law. 
It should be noted that the land tenure reforms do not provide famers with rights to use their 
land as collateral. The 1995 Guarantee Law prohibits the mortgaging of use rights to arable land. 
The underlying reason for denying rural households this right is the fear that mortgaging land use 
rights may drive farmers into landlessness. 
In summary, land use rights could not be transferred freely and tenure security was impaired 
by frequent land reallocations and ambiguous land rights definition after the establishment of the 
HRS. Subsequent land tenure reforms significantly increased land tenure security and 
transferability. This was realized by: (1) extending farmers‘ land rights with a period of 30 years in 
the 1998 LAL and the 2002 RLCL, and giving them a permanent status in the 2007 PL and the 2008 
document; (2) restricting land reallocations in the 1998 LAL, and prohibiting full-scale land 
reallocations and narrowing the scope of partial land reallocations in the 2002 RLCL; (3) mandatory 
issuing of land certificates to farmers in the 1998 LAL; (4) defining land use rights as usufruct 
rights and specifying farmers‘ compensation for losing land use rights in the 2002 RLCL, and (5) 
specifying land transfer rights in the 1998 LAL, and identifying the modes of land transfers in the 
2002 RLCL and the 2008 document. 
3. Characteristics of Land Conservation Investments in China 
The improvements in land tenure security and transferability that result from the recent legal 
reforms in China are expected to encourage longer term investments in the quality of land and 
hence its productivity. Benefits of productivity enhancements that have an effect also in the future 
are more likely to be captured by the investor. Examples of land quality improving investments 
made by farmers include the use of organic manure, well digging, land leveling, surface irrigation, 
drainage, terracing, and others. Contrary to variable inputs such as seeds, chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, and herbicides, these investments contribute more than one season to output and can 
improve soil quality and agricultural production in the long term. Important characteristics of long-
term on-farm land-related investments are the irreversibility of cost, uncertainty of benefits, and 
flexibility of investment. We discuss each of them in turn. 
Cost irreversibility: Land conservation investments are linked to specific plots. It is not easy to 
retrieve them or transfer them technically and economically to other plots because of immobility of 
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land. Despite the fact that farmers can retrieve some parts of the benefits by transferring plots with 
land conservation investments to others via land rental markets, it is often hard to calculate the pure 
incremental benefits from land conservation investments accurately and, as a result, difficult to get a 
price agreement. In the case of land rental markets failures, which are common in rural China, this 
problem is even more serious. Hence there may be important irreversible costs linked with long-
term land conservation investments.  
Uncertainty of benefits: There may be several sources of uncertainty in reaping the benefits of 
land conservation investments. One important source is tenure insecurity. Farmers loose (part of) 
the benefits of investments that they make in a plot, when the use right of the plot in question is 
taken from them without adequate compensation for the investment. This may happen, for example, 
when land is reallocated within a village to correct for demographic changes or when land is taken 
away from farm households moving out of a village for off-farm employment. Other sources of 
uncertainty include natural disasters, which can seriously damage a crop and depress the benefits of 
land-related investments, volatility of output and output and input prices, uncertainty in market 
relationships and the policy environment.  
Investment flexibility: Rural land in China is assigned to the households living within a village 
on the basis of equality. Households that are registered in a village always have access to some of 
its land, unless a household decides to change its registration and leave the village. Every household 
has a right to make investments in its land; others cannot deprive the investment opportunity 
attached to the land. In this situation, rural households can decide to defer land-related investments 
until the most appropriate moment. In other words, land conservation investments are flexible over 
time. 
In the next section, these characteristics of land conservation investments are used to analyze 
how the recent land tenure reforms in China affect investment incentives in land conservation 
investments of rural households. Although the focus is on household investment decisions, many 
aspects are equally relevant for so-called self-governed investments that are jointly made by 
households belonging to the same natural or administrative village.  
4. Land Tenure Reforms and Land Conservation 
Investment Incentives: a Real Option Value Analysis 
4.1 Real Option Value Theory and Land Conservation Investments 
The ROV model is a suitable tool for analyzing the optimal rule of irreversible investments 
under uncertainty when investors have a flexibility of making decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Wong 2007). Empirical studies in an agricultural context, either based on field data - such as Hill 
(2010) and Hinrichs et al. (2008) - or on an experimental approach - such as Maart-Noelck and 
Musshoff (2013) - have provided convincing evidence of the existence of a ROV. These studies 
favor the explanatory power of the ROV over the NPV in understanding investment behavior of 
farmers.  
Given the characteristics of land conservation investments discussed in the previous section, 
the real option model is a suitable tool for examining farm-level land conservation investment 
decisions. Two seminal models in this field analyze the value of the option to invest and the optimal 
rule for exercising that option as well (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). The 
key principle of real option value (ROV) theory is that, given the presence of uncertainty and 
irreversibility of benefits and costs, investors value the flexibility to decide about making an 
investment (Wesseler, 2009). The method used for deriving the critical value (threshold) for making 
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an investment is to risk-adjust the future pay-offs of an investment so that cash flows are discounted 
at a ‗risk-free‘ rate. 
4.2 Effect of Land Tenure Reforms on Land Conservation Investments 
Improved tenure security and alienability allow an investor to sell or rent his investment in the 
event that profitable outside opportunities arise (Besley, 1995). It also permits a cultivator to 
overcome the problem of long time horizons, since he does not need to wait through the whole 
gestation period of an investment in order to reap the full benefit from it (Deininger and Jin, 2006). 
Another potential effect of land tenure reforms is the benefits from increased access to capital 
through the use of land as collateral which is expected to stimulate land conservation investments 
(e.g. Besley, 1995).  
The recent land tenure reforms in China are expected to reduce the uncertainty of benefits of 
land conservation investments. As discussed in section 2, the reforms aim at reducing the frequency 
of land reallocations, providing farmers with formal land tenure certificates and granting perpetual 
land use rights. Hence, farmers are less likely to lose a plot in which they made an investment. In 
the case of China, however, use of land as collateral remains prohibited. The so-called col-
lateralizability effect of land tenure reforms is therefore limited. 
Farmers who migrate out of their village will generally be compensated for investments that 
they made in the land. Two categories of migrants need to be distinguished in this respect. Migrants 
who register in a city will receive a reasonable compensation for their land investments according to 
relevant recent laws. More secure tenure therefore reduces the threat that not all investment benefits 
can be reaped for this group. Migrants who maintain their registration in the village, on the other 
hand, run the risk of losing their land when they do not cultivate it. When land transfers are 
prohibited, these migrants normally lose all the benefits of their investments. The recent land 
reforms in China, however, intend to increase land tenure transferability. By renting out their land 
to other households, migrant households have better opportunities to retrieve the benefits of their 
investments in land quality by negotiating a rental price that reflects these quality improvements. 
The impact of uncertainty of project benefits on a project‘s net present value can be analyzed 
with the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). It specifies the present value of an 
investment project (X) as equation (1): 
  
                
    
                         (1) 
Where       is the expected return of the investment opportunity;   the market price of risk; 
  the uncertain return of alternative investment opportunities, the market portfolio;           the 
covariance of the uncertain returns of the investment opportunity with the uncertain returns of 
alternative investment opportunities; and    the risk-free rate of return. Equation (1) implies that an 
increase in the uncertainty of the project benefits decreases the present value of the project (X) (e.g. 
Sarkar, 2000). 
The effect of tenure (in) security on land conservation investments has been analyzed based on 
the traditional NPV principle in the prevailing literature (see e.g. Jacoby et al. 2002; Abdulai et al. 
2011), we call this the present value effect (PVE). Following the canonical real option models by 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
2
 and the link between the CAPM and the real option model by Wong 
                                                          
2 More complex situations have been discussed in the literature on real option values, including 
investment and disinvestments (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), the effects of different stochastic processes 
(Mbah et al., 2010), and numerical approaches (Trigeorgis, 1998). This paper focuses on the generic 
model as these model modifications do not change our basic argument. 
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(2007), we can get the optimal investment rule when farmers have the option to postpone 
investments: 
                 
                
 
                 (2) 
Solving Equation (2) according to the standard real option pricing approach provides the 
investment trigger X*: 
   
 
   
I, with                                        (3) 
  
 
 
 
     
  
  
 
 
 
     
  
 
   
  
                       (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) give the threshold of a land conservation project, X
*
, which depend on 
the irreversible cost (I), the market price of risk (λ), the risk-free rate of return (  ), the correlation 
coefficient between the return of the project and the return on the opportunity cost – the market 
portfolio (ρ), the drift or growth rate (α), and the volatility (uncertainty) of the project benefits (σ). 
The relationship between σ and X* can be can be either positive or negative (Weaver and Wesseler, 
2004; Wong, 2007) as a change in uncertainty affects the value of the project X as well as the real 
option value of the project F(X). This implies that a reduction in the uncertainty of project benefits, 
caused for example by improved tenure security, may decrease or increase the threshold of the land 
investment project depending on the combination of the effect on the value of the project and on the 
real option value. We hereby call the overall effect on the real option value the option value effect 
(OVE). Whether farmers undertake a land conservation investment project immediately after the 
land reforms depends on whether or not as a result the present value of the project (X) is larger than 
the (new) threshold (X*). 
Figure 1 shows that the overall investment incentives of China‘s market-oriented land tenure 
reforms hence depend on the combination of PVE and OVE. The upper part of the figure shows the 
impact of the market-oriented tenure reforms on tenure security and land transferability, as 
discussed in section 2.2. Improved tenure security and land transferability are both expected to 
reduce the uncertainty in investment project benefits, as argued in section 4.2. In its turn, a 
reduction in the uncertainty of investment project benefits affects the present value of a project 
(equation (1) in section 4.2) as well as the option value of the project (equations (3) and (4) in 
section 4.2). Both the PVE and the OVE raise the overall land conservation investment incentives 
(bottom of Figure 1). 
4.3 Land Tenure Reforms and the Timing of Land Conservation Investments 
The PVE and OVE of increased tenure security may affect the timing of undertaking land 
conservation investments. This section analyzes the optimal timing of land investments under 
different institutional settings, i.e. before and after the land tenure reforms and with/without 
functioning land markets. 
As discussed above, land tenure was more insecure and land was formally not transferable 
before the land tenure reforms started. As a result, the uncertainty in reaping the benefits of land 
investment projects was relatively high (see Figure 2). In Figure 2 the horizontal measures the 
present value of the project (X), while the vertical axis measures the ROV (F(X)) and the net present 
value of the project (X-I), where I denotes the cost of the project. The line X - I intersects the 
horizontal axis at a 45° angle. Point I at the horizontal axis gives the threshold of undertaking the 
project in NPV analysis. The tangency point of the ROV curve F(X) with the line X - I gives the 
critical value X* of the project in ROV analysis. Figure 2 shows that the present value of the project 
(X
a
) is much smaller than the threshold of undertaking the project (X
*
), which implies that a rational 
farmer will not undertake the investment. Even when we ignore the real option value of undertaking 
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the project, and employ the traditional NPV approach, the investment is unlikely to take place 
because the present value of the project (X
a
) is smaller than the investment cost (I). This explains 
why the literature based on the conventional NPV approach also points out weak and insecure land 
tenure discourages farmers‘ land conservation investments (Jacoby et al., 2002; Deininger and Jin, 
2006). Applying the real option approach we obtain the real option value, shown in the graph as 
F(X
a
). In this case, the time value of the option is positive but small. The intrinsic value of the 
option, however, is zero as the option is ―out of the money‖. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As argued above, China‘s recent land tenure reforms significantly improve land tenure security 
and transferability, and thereby decrease the uncertainty of the benefits of investments in land. It is 
likely, however, that the magnitude of the reduction in uncertainty of benefits differs between 
different regions for at least two reasons. In the first place, the flexibility and ambiguity that is 
inherent to the land laws and land use regulations allow for a flexible interpretation and adaptation 
of the land laws by local actors (Piotrowski, 2009). For example, recent land laws restrict the use of 
land reallocations by village leaders, but land reallocations still do occur and their frequency shows 
large regional differences (Wang et al., 2011). Secondly, even when the interpretation and 
implementation of land laws and land use regulations is the same, the degree of uncertainty in the 
benefits that can be derived from land investments may differ if there exist differences in the 
presence of well-functioning land markets. In villages where land markets are absent, as still seems 
to be the case in large parts of rural China (Brandt et al., 2002), farmers are less certain that they can 
reap the full benefits of an investment. 
 
 
Figure 1. Impact of land tenure reforms on land conservation investments: a framework  
As argued above, China‘s recent land tenure reforms significantly improve 
land tenure security and transferability, and thereby decrease the uncertainty of the 
benefits of investments in land. It is likely, however, that the magnitud  of the 
reduction in uncertainty of benefits differs betwee  different regi ns for at least two 
reasons. In the first place, the flexibility and ambiguity that is inherent to the land 
laws and land use regulations allow for a flexible interpretation and adaptation of 
the land laws by local act rs (Piotrowski, 2009). For example, recent land laws 
restrict the use of land reallocations by village leaders, but land reallocations still do 
occur an  their frequency shows large regional differences (Wa g et al., 2011). 
Secondly, eve  when the interpretation and implementation of land laws a d land 
use regulations is the same, the degree of uncertainty in the benefits that can be 
derived from land investments may differ if there exist differences in the presence 
of well-functioning land markets. In villages where land markets are absent, as still 
seems to be the case in large parts of rural China(Brandt et al., 2002), farmers are 
less certain that they can reap the full benefits of an investment. 
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Figure 2. The value of land conservation investment under high uncertainty in ROV and NPV analysis 
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of a reduction in uncertainty of project benefits. As a result of 
the lower degree of uncertainty, the reasonable assumption has been made the present value of a 
land conservation investment increases from X
a
 to X
b
. This is the PVE specified in equation (1). But 
the curve of the real option value function of the project simultaneously shifts downwards from F(X) 
to G(X), and thereby decreases the threshold of undertaking the project from X
*
 to X
*‘
. This is the 
OVE specified in equations (3) and (4). If the traditional NPV approach is used, a profit maximizing 
farmer will undertake the project immediately because X
b
-I > 0. However, in the example in Figure 
3 the value of X
b
 is smaller than the value of the ROV threshold X
*‘
. In other words, a profit 
maximizing farmer is expected to require a higher value for immediate investment because he has 
the option to postpone the investment until some uncertainty has been eliminated. 
It should also be noticed that the improvements in land tenure security and transferability 
provide an indirect economic benefit to investment projects that are not undertaken immediately, 
because the ROV has increased from F(X
a
) to G(X
b
). This increase can be considered as an 
economic benefit of the land tenure reforms. In general G(X
b
) > F(X
a
), and hence the ROV increases, 
even though the real option value function F(X) moves downwards to G(X).
3
 
The situation depicted in Figure 3 would change considerably if the reduction in uncertainty 
increases the value of the project such that X
b
 > X
*‘
. In that case the option to invest in land 
conservation is expected to be exercised immediately. In that case the PVE is sufficiently large to 
induce investment. This situation is more likely to occur in areas where well-functioning land 
transfer markets exist as they allow farmers who transfer their land to recapture a larger share of 
benefits of their land investments. 
                                                          
3 A reduction in uncertainty will reduce the downward movement of the underlying stochastic process 
either in the form of changes in the probability distribution or in the form of reduced losses in case 
of bad outcomes, with a larger real option value G(Xb) > F(Xa) as the overall effect (Shreve, 2004). 
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Figure 3. Changes in the real option value of land conservation investments induced by 
lower uncertainty in ROV and NPV analysis 
5. Conclusion 
The available literature on tenure security and land investments, in China and other parts of the 
world, focuses on the changes in net present value generated by improved security. This paper 
argues that land investments in China are characterized by cost irreversibility, uncertainty of 
benefits, and investment flexibility, and that changes in the real option value should therefore also 
be taken into account. 
Using real option value theory, this paper shows that the market-oriented land tenure reforms 
which aim at improving land tenure security and land transferability in China have both a present 
value effect (PVE) and an option value effect (OVE) on land conservation investments. The PVE 
represents the conventional impact of tenure (in) security on the present value of a land investment 
project. The OVE represents the change in the real option value of a land investment project. The 
OVE of improved tenure security and land transferability is to decrease the threshold of undertaking 
the investment project. If the OVE is ignored, we may underestimate the impact of market-oriented 
land tenure reforms on land value, and also incorrectly predict the likelihood of farmers‘ 
undertaking investments in their land. In fact, by improving tenure security and land transferability, 
China‘s market-oriented land tenure reforms improve the long-term investment environment of land 
and eventually increase land value and famers‘ welfare, whether or not these land-related 
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investments are immediately observable. Therefore, further implementation of the market-oriented 
land tenure reforms in China is expected to enhance farmers‘ incentives for undertaking land 
conservation investments. Besides land-related laws and regulations, supplementary measures may 
be taken to improve household perceptions of tenure security, such as provision of information 
about the importance of land certificates for pursuing rights in land conflicts. 
In addition, provided that the market-oriented land tenure reforms are implemented in a 
satisfactory way, the presence of well-functioning land transfer markets will be a crucial factor 
influencing the likelihood of making land conservation investments. A number of factors, such as 
the household registration system, insufficient off-farm employment opportunities, and lower level 
of trust among households, currently prohibit the development of land transfer markets in some 
parts of China and other developing countries (Zhang et al., 2004; Holden and Ghebru, 2005; Feng, 
2006; Whalley and Zhang, 2007). The absence of well-functioning land markets reduces the 
possibilities to retrieve the benefits of an investment in land quality, and thereby decreases the 
positive impact of the land tenure reforms on land conservation investments. Market-oriented land 
tenure reforms therefore need to be accompanied by measures to remove existing barriers in the 
rural land transfer market in order to fully realize their potential impact on land conservation 
investments. Measures that may be considered in this respect include provision of sufficient and 
stable off-farm employment jobs, reduction in discrimination on urban and rural residents 
associated with the household registration system, and enhancement of trust among households in 
China.  
This analysis has two important implications for future research. Firstly, it shows that market-
oriented land tenure reforms provide economic benefits to farm households either by stimulating 
investments in the quality of their land (visible direct benefit) or by improving the long-term 
investment environment of their land (invisible indirect benefit in the form of real option value). We 
suggest that future research in this field collects panel data at the household level that allows to 
estimate the invisible indirect benefit of policy reforms using real option model approaches (see e.g. 
Carey and Zilberman, 2002; Rahim et al., 2007; Wesseler et al., 2007; Towe et al., 2008; Wesseler, 
2009). Secondly, this analysis shows that the presence of well-functioning land markets is crucial 
for realizing the full potential impact of market-oriented land tenure reforms on investment 
incentives. Future research in this field may therefore take prevailing land market conditions into 
account when analyzing changes in investment incentives caused by land tenure reforms, and test 
whether reform-induced changes in investment incentives differ significantly between areas with 
well-functioning land markets and areas with thin or absent land markets. 
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